The next Yemen war might be different

As the conflict in Yemen rages on and spills over into the Red Sea, developments in recent weeks reveal a new trend worth pondering. The Houthis group, which for years almost monopolised the advantage of drone warfare, has begun facing fire from the same weapon used by its opponents on multiple fronts.

This does not mean that the balance of power has shifted, or that the Houthis have lost their missile and drone superiority. However, the increasing use of this type of warfare by the forces loyal to the internationally recognised government may change the nature of the confrontation, especially if it shifts from scattered operations to an organised and sustained capability.

For years, the Houthis were able to use drones as one of the most important weapons of asymmetric warfare. They were able to monitor their opponents and strike their gatherings, command centres and facilities far from the lines of contact, while government forces were mostly in a position of defence and interception.

Forces affiliated with the government have announced in recent days the use of drones against Houthi positions in Marib, al-Jawf, Taiz, Hajjah, al-Dhalea and other fronts – and have shown video of a number of those operations.

It is not yet possible to speak of parity in drone power. The Houthis have years of experience and a more advanced missile and drone infrastructure. However, the government does not necessarily need full parity in order to bring about change on the battlefield.

It is enough for Houthi gatherings, vehicles, artillery, reinforcements and command centres to become vulnerable to strikes for them to be forced to change their patterns of deployment, movement and supply. In war, forcing the enemy to change its behaviour is in itself a military achievement.

It would be wrong to say that the Houthis have moved onto the defensive. They are carrying out broad offensive operations: they have struck Marib and Hadramout, repeatedly targeted al-Makha (Mocha), escalated against Saudi Arabia and once again moved their operations to the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb.

But there is a difference between the group being on a strategic defensive and beginning to act on some fronts as though it must prepare for a possible attack.