Switzerland’s neutrality vote is asking the wrong question

Senior Researcher at the Centre on Conflict Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) at the Geneva Graduate Institute.

On September 27, Switzerland votes on whether to lock a stricter definition of neutrality into its constitution. The initiative would bar Switzerland from cooperating with a military alliance unless it were under military attack or such an attack were being prepared, and prevent it from imposing sanctions on a belligerent state unless those sanctions were mandated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Polls suggest it will fail, with 63 percent intending to reject it. But that result says less about Swiss faith in neutrality — which remains overwhelming — than about how badly the vote and the surrounding debates miss the real issue: the vote asks whether to restrict sanctions and alliances; the real question is how neutrality can still deliver security and prosperity.

Neutrality has shaped Swiss identity since 1815, when the European powers recognised Switzerland’s permanent neutrality after the Napoleonic Wars. It survived two world wars and the Cold War on a basic premise: keeping foreign armies off Swiss territory would keep Switzerland out of other countries’ wars, while trading with all sides would keep its diverse economy connected to the markets on which its welfare depends.

The neutrality initiative grew out of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Switzerland had adopted European Union sanctions before, but sanctioning Russia specifically — a major power Switzerland had long sought not to antagonise — cut deeper. It sharpened a question earlier cases had already raised: whether economic measures against a belligerent power were compatible with neutrality at all. The Swiss People’s Party and Pro Schweiz, or Pro Suisse, launched the initiative to preserve the stricter model they believed had served Switzerland well.

A “yes” vote would bring significant changes, while a “no” would largely mean a continuation of the flexible, case-by-case neutrality Switzerland practises today. A “yes” could force Switzerland to unwind its existing sanctions against Russia and would prevent it from joining future EU- or United States-led sanctions against belligerent states unless those sanctions were mandated by the UNSC. It would also constrain the bilateral cyber, air-defence and joint-exercise cooperation with its neighbours (that happen to be members of NATO) that Switzerland has expanded since 2022 — precisely the kind of cooperation it may need more of as the European security environment deteriorates. But whichever way Switzerland votes, the harder questions will remain, because the initiative answers a 2022 question, and the world has moved on in three ways it cannot address.

Three things have changed since 2022: the nature of the threat from Russia, the reliability of the US as a trading partner and the strategic implications of China’s economic weight.

The first is the threat itself. For two centuries, Swiss neutrality was designed primarily to protect its security in the context of a territorial war. Switzerland, a heavily armed state in the Alps, made invasion costly and denied foreign armies an easy route through Swiss territory. That model has much less to say about a new threat: a European war that indirectly yet significantly affects Switzerland.

Switzerland’s 2026 Security Policy Strategy warns of a “window of vulnerability” emerging in Europe around 2028 as Russia rebuilds military capacity while Europe rearms. In such a conflict, Switzerland could face missiles or drones crossing its airspace without knowing immediately who launched them or where they are headed. Switzerland is also deeply integrated into Europe’s financial, rail, electricity and data networks. A continental conflict would therefore reach it even if no foreign soldier crossed its border.